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Abstract
The way in which individual expectations shape aggregate macroeconomic vari-
ables is crucial for the transmission and e®ectiveness of monetary policy. We study
the individual expectations formation process and the interaction with monetary
policy, within a standard New Keynesian model, by means of laboratory experi-
ments with human subjects. We ¯nd that a more aggressive monetary policy that
sets the interest rate more than point for point in response to in°ation stabilizes in-
°ation in our experimental economies. We use a simple model of individual learning,
with a performance-based evolutionary selection among heterogeneous forecasting
heuristics, to explain coordination of individual expectations and aggregate macro
behavior observed in the laboratory experiments. Three aggregate outcomes are ob-
served: convergence to some equilibrium level, persistent oscillatory behavior and
oscillatory convergence. A simple heterogeneous expectations switching model ¯ts
individual learning as well as aggregate outcomes and outperforms homogeneous
expectations benchmarks.
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11 Introduction
In°ation expectations are crucial in the transmission of monetary policy. The way
in which individual expectations are formed, therefore, is key in understanding how
a change in the interest rate a®ects output and the actual in°ation rate. Since the
seminal papers of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972) the rational expectations hypothe-
sis has become the cornerstone of macroeconomic theory, with representative ratio-
nal agent models dominating mainstream economics. For monetary policy analysis
the most popular model is the New Keynesian (NK) framework which assumes, in
its basic formulation, a representative rational agent structure (see e.g. Woodford
(2003) and Gali (2008)). The standard NK model with a rational representative
agent however has lost most of its appeal in the light of overwhelming empirical
evidence: it is clear from the data that this approach is not the most suitable to
reproduce stylized facts such as the persistence of °uctuations in real activity and
in°ation after a shock (see e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) and Nelson
(1998)). Economists have therefore proposed a number of extensions to the stan-
dard framework by embedding potential sources of endogenous persistence. They
have incorporated features such as habit formation or various adjustment costs to
account for the inertia in the data (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007)).
In the last two decades adaptive learning has become an interesting alterna-
tive to modeling expectations (see e.g. Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001)). Bullard and Mitra (2002), Preston (2005) among others, introduce
adaptive learning in the NK framework and Milani (2007) shows that learning
can represent an important source of persistence in the economy and that some
extensions which are typically needed under rational expectations to match the
observed inertia become redundant under learning. More recently a number of au-
thors have extended the NK model to include heterogeneous expectations, e.g. Gali
and Gertler (1999), De Grauwe (2010) and Branch and McGough (2009, 2010).
2The empirical literature on expectations in a macro-monetary policy setting
can be subdivided in work on survey data and laboratory experiments with human
subjects. Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) ¯nd evidence for heterogeneity in
in°ation expectations in the Michigan Survey of Consumers and argue that the
data are inconsistent with rational or adaptive expectations, but may be consistent
with a sticky information model. Branch (2004) estimates a simple switching model
with heterogeneous expectations on survey data and provides empirical evidence
for dynamic switching that depends on the relative mean squared errors of the
predictors. Capistran and Timmermann (2009) show that heterogeneity of in°ation
expectations of professional forecasters varies over time and depends on the level
and the variance of current in°ation. Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) measure the
degree of heterogeneity in private agents' in°ation forecasts by exploring time series
of percentiles from the empirical distribution of survey data. They show that
heterogeneity in in°ation expectations is persistent and identify three di®erent
expectations formation mechanisms: static or highly autoregressive rules, nearly
rational expectations and adaptive learning with sticky information. Experiments
with human subjects in a controlled laboratory environment to study individual
expectations have been carried out by, e.g., Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and
van de Velden (2005), Adam (2007), Pfajfar and Zakelj (2010); see Du®y (2008) for
an overview of macro experiments, and Hommes (2011) for an overview of learning
to forecast experiments to study expectation formation.
In this paper we use laboratory experiments with human subjects to study
the individual expectations formation process within a standard New Keynesian
setup. We ask subjects to forecast the in°ation rate under three di®erent scenar-
ios depending on the underlying assumption on output gap expectations, namely
fundamental, naive or forecasts from a group of individuals in the laboratory. An
important novel feature of our experiment is that, in one of the treatments, the
aggregate variables in°ation and output gap depend on individual expectations of
two groups of individuals forming expectations on two di®erent variables, in°ation
3and the output gap. In particular, we address the following questions:
² are expectations homogeneous or heterogeneous?
² which forecasting rules do individuals use?
² which theory of expectations and learning ¯ts the aggregate as well as indi-
vidual experimental data?
² which monetary policy rules can stabilize aggregate outcomes in learning to
forecast experiments?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the underlying NK-model
framework, the di®erent treatments, the experimental design and the experimental
results. Section 3 analyzes the individual forecasting rules used by the subjects,
while Section 4 proposes a heterogeneous expectations model explaining both in-
dividual expectations and aggregate outcomes. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The learning to forecast experiment
In 2.1 we brie°y recall the New Keynesian model and then we give a description of
the treatments in the experiment. In 2.2 we give an overview of the experimental
design and in 2.3 we summarize the main results.
2.1 The New Keynesian model
In this section we recall the monetary model with nominal rigidities that will be
used in the experiment. We adopt the heterogeneous expectations version of the
New Keynesian model developed by Branch and McGough (2009), which is de-
scribed by the following equations:
yt = y
e
t+1 ¡ '(it ¡ ¼
e
t+1) + gt ; (2.1)
¼t = ¸yt + ¯¼
e
t+1 + ut ; (2.2)
it = ¼ + Á¼(¼t ¡ ¼); (2.3)
4where yt and ye
t+1 are respectively the actual and average expected output gap, it
is the nominal interest rate, ¼t and ¼e
t+1 are respectively the actual and average
expected in°ation rates, ¼ is the in°ation target, ', ¸, ¯ and Á¼ are positive co-
e±cients and gt and ut are white noise shocks. The coe±cient Á¼ measures the
response of the nominal interest rate it to deviations of the in°ation rate ¼t from
its target ¼. Equation (2.1) is the aggregate demand in which the output gap yt
depends on the average expected output gap ye
t+1 and on the real interest rate
it ¡ ¼e
t+1. Equation (2.2) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve according to which
the in°ation rate depends on the output gap and on average expected in°ation.
Equation (2.3) is the monetary policy rule implemented by the monetary author-
ity in order to keep in°ation at its target value ¼. The New Keynesian model
is widely used in monetary policy analysis and allows us to compare our experi-
mental results with those obtained in the theoretical literature. However the New
Keynesian framework requires agents to forecast both in°ation and the output gap.
Since forecasting two variables at the same time might be a too di±cult task for
the participants in an experiment we decided to run an experiment using three
di®erent treatments. In the ¯rst two treatments we make an assumption about
output gap expectations (a steady state equilibrium predictor and naive expecta-
tions respectively), so that the task of the participants reduces to forecast only
one macroeconomic variable, namely in°ation. In the third treatment there are
two groups of individuals, one group forecasting in°ation and the other forecasting
output gap. The details of the di®erent treatments are described below.
Treatment 1: steady state predictor for output gap
In the ¯rst treatment of the experiment we ask subjects to forecast the in°ation
rate two periods ahead, given that the expectations on the output gap are ¯xed
at the equilibrium predictor (i.e. ye
t+1 = (1 ¡ ¯)¼¸¡1). Given this setup the NK
5framework (2.1)-(2.3) specializes to:
yt = (1 ¡ ¯)¼¸
¡1 ¡ '(it ¡ ¼
e
t+1) + gt ; (2.4)
¼t = ¸yt + ¯¼
e
t+1 + ut ; (2.5)






i;t+1 is the average prediction of the participants in the
experiment. Substituting (2.6) into (2.4) leads to the system
yt = (1 ¡ ¯)¼¸
¡1 + '¼(Á¼ ¡ 1) ¡ 'Á¼¼t + '¼
e
t+1 + gt ; (2.7)
¼t = ¸yt + ¯¼
e
t+1 + ut : (2.8)
The above system can be rewritten in terms of in°ation and expected in°ation:





t+1 + »t ; (2.9)
where A¼ =
(1 ¡ ¯)¼ + ¸'¼(Á¼ ¡ 1)
1 + ¸'Á¼
is a constant and »t = ¸
1+¸'Á¼gt + 1
1+¸'Á¼ut is
a composite shock. Hence, treatment 1 reduces to a learning to forecast experiment
on a single variable, in°ation, comparable to the learning to forecast experiments
on asset prices in Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005) and
on in°ation in Adam (2007)1.
Treatment 2: naive expectations for output gap
In the second treatment we ask subjects to forecast only the in°ation rate (two
periods ahead), while expectations on the output gap are represented by naive
expectations (i.e. ye
t+1 = yt¡1). This treatment is similar to the experiment in
Pfajfar and Zakelj (2010) who also implicitly assume naive expectations on output.
1Given the calibrated values of the structural parameters, described in Section 2.3, the coef-
¯cient
¸'+¯
1+¸'Á¼ in (2.9) measuring expectation feedback takes the value of about 0:99 when the
policy rule's reaction coe±cient Á¼ = 1, and of about 0:89 when Á¼ = 1:5. The corresponding
expectation feedback coe±cient in Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005) was
0:95.
6Given this set up the NK framework (2.1)-(2.3) specializes to:
yt = '¼(Á¼ ¡ 1) ¡ 'Á¼¼t + '¼
e
t+1 + yt¡1 + gt ; (2.10)
¼t = ¸yt + ¯¼
e






i;t+1 is the average prediction of the participants in the
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This setup is more complicated than the learning to forecast experiments in
Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005) and Adam (2007) be-
cause in°ation is not only driven by expected in°ation and exogenous noise, but
also by the past output gap yt¡1. An important di®erence with Pfajfar and Zakelj
(2010) is that we assume IID noise instead of an AR(1) noise process, so that if
°uctuations in in°ation will arise in the experiment they must be endogenously
driven by expectations.
Treatment 3: forecasting in°ation and output gap
In the third treatment there are two groups of participants acting in the same econ-
omy but with di®erent tasks: one group forecasts in°ation while the other forecasts
the output gap. Agents are divided randomly into two groups, one group is asked
to form expectations on the in°ation rate and another group provides forecasts on
the output gap. The aggregate variables in°ation and output gap are thus driven
by individual expectations feedbacks from two di®erent variables by two di®erent
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i;t+1 are respectively the average output gap and the average in-
°ation predictions of the participants in the experiment. As already pointed out,
in treatments 1 and 2 individuals are asked to forecast only the in°ation rate two
periods ahead, assuming respectively that the expected future output gap is given
by the equilibrium predictor (ye
t+1 = (1 ¡ ¯)¼¸¡1) or follows naive expectations
(ye
t+1 = yt¡1). An important novel aspect of Treatment 3 is that our experimental
economy is driven by individual expectations on two di®erent aggregate variables
that interact within a New Keynesian framework.
Treatments a/b: passive versus active monetary policy
In order to study the stabilization properties of a monetary policy rule such as
(2.3), we ran two experimental sessions for each of the three di®erent treatments
described above. In session "a" the monetary policy responds only weakly to in-
°ation rate °uctuations i.e., the Taylor principle does not hold (Á¼ = 1), while
in session "b" monetary policy responds aggressively to in°ation i.e., the Taylor
principle holds2 (Á¼ = 1:5).
Table 1 summarizes all treatments implemented in the experiments. In total
120 subjects participated in the experiment in 16 experimental economies, 3 for
each of the treatments 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b with 6 subjects each, and 2 experimental
economies for treatments 3a and 3b with 12 subjects each. Total average earnings
over all subjects were ￿ 32.
2Notice that when the policy parameter Á¼ is equal to 1, the system in Treatments 2 and 3
exhibits a continuum of equilibria.
8Á¼ ¼e
t+1 ye
t+1 # groups average earnings ¼ (y) in ￿
Treatment 1a 1 ¼e
t+1 (1 ¡ ¯)¼¸¡1 3 31
Treatment 1b 1.5 ¼e
t+1 (1 ¡ ¯)¼¸¡1 3 37
Treatment 2a 1 ¼e
t+1 yt¡1 3 28
Treatment 2b 1.5 ¼e
t+1 yt¡1 3 36
Treatment 3a 1 ¼e
t+1 ye
t+1 2 28 (28)
Treatment 3b 1.5 ¼e
t+1 ye
t+1 2 34 (32)
Table 1: Treatments summary
2.2 Experimental design
The experiment took place in the CREED laboratory at the University of Amster-
dam, March-May 2009. For treatments 1 and 2, groups of six (unknown) individuals
were formed who had to forecast in°ation two periods ahead; for treatment 3 two
groups of six individuals were formed, one group forecasting in°ation, the other
group forecasting the output gap. Most subjects are undergraduate students from
Economics, Chemistry and Psychology. At the beginning of the session each sub-
ject can read the instructions (see Supplementary material, (Translation of Dutch)
Instructions for participants) on the screen, and subjects receive also a written
copy. Participants are instructed about their role as forecasters and about the
experimental economy. They are assumed to be employed in a private ¯rm of pro-
fessional forecasters for the key variables of the economy under scrutiny i.e. either
the in°ation rate or the output gap. Subjects have to forecast either in°ation or
the output gap for 50 periods. We give them some general information about the
variables that describe the economy: the output gap (yt), the in°ation rate (¼t) and
the interest rate (it). Subjects are also informed about the expectations feedback,
that realized in°ation and output gap depend on (other) subjects' expectations
about in°ation and output gap. They also know that in°ation and output gap
are a®ected by small random shocks to the economy. Subjects did not know the
equations of the underlying law of motion of the economy nor did they have any
information about its steady states. In short, subjects did not have quantitative
details, but only qualitative information about the economy.
9The payo® function of the subjects describing their score that is later converted





where f is the absolute value of the forecast error expressed in percentage points.
The points earned by the participants depend on how close their predictions are
to the realized values of the variable they are forecasting. Information about the
payo® function is given graphically as well as in table form to the participants (see
Fig. 1). Notice that the prediction score increases sharply when the error decreases
to 0, so that subjects have a strong incentive to forecast as accurately as they can;
see also Adam (2007) and Pfajfar and Zakelj (2010), who used the same payo®
function.


























































































































































































































0series of their own forecasts. The same information is displayed on the right hand
side of the screen in table form, together with subjects own predictions scores (see
Fig. 2). Subjects did not have any information about the forecasts of others.
Figure 2: Computer screen for in°ation forecasters with time series of in°ation
forecasts and realizations (top left), output gap and interest rate (bottom left) and
table (top right).
2.3 Experimental results
This subsection describes the results of the experiment. We ¯x the parameters at
the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) calibration, i.e. ¯ = 0:99, ' = 1, and ¸ = 0:3,
and we set the in°ation target to ¼ = 2.
Figure 3 depicts the behavior of the output gap, in°ation and individual fore-
casts in the three di®erent sessions of treatments 1a and 1b with output expecta-
tions given by the steady state predictor. The dotted lines in the ¯gures represent
the RE steady states for in°ation and output gap that are respectively 2 and 0:07.
In treatment 1a (Á¼ = 1) we observe convergence to a non-fundamental steady
state for two groups, while the third group displays highly unstable oscillations3.
3The unstable °uctuations were mainly caused by one participant making very high and very
low forecasts.
































































































Figure 3: Time series of Treatment 1, with fundamental predictor for the output
gap. Upper panels: Treatment 1a (Á¼ = 1). Lower panels: Treatment 1b
(Á¼ = 1:5). Blue thick line: realized in°ation; yellow thick line: realized output
gap; thin lines: individual forecasts for in°ation.
12In treatment 1b (Á¼=1:5) we observe convergence to the in°ation target for two
groups, while the third group exhibits oscillatory behavior which is by far less
pronounced than what we observed in treatment 1a, group 2.
We conclude that, under the assumption of a fundamental predictor for expected
future output gap, a more aggressive monetary policy that satis¯es the Taylor
principle (Á¼ > 1) stabilizes in°ation °uctuations and leads to convergence to the
desired in°ation target in two of the three groups.
Fig. 4 shows the behavior of the output gap, in°ation and individual forecasts in
three di®erent groups of treatments 2a and 2b with naive output gap expectations.
In treatment 2a (Á¼ = 1) we observe di®erent types of aggregate dynamics. Group
1 shows convergence to a non-fundamental steady state. Group 2 shows oscillatory
behavior with individual expectations coordinating on the oscillatory pattern. In
this session the interest rate hits the zero lower bound in period 43 and the ex-
perimental economy experiences a phase of decline in output gap but eventually
recovers. In group 3 the behavior is even more unstable: in°ation oscillates until,
in period 27, the interest rate hits the zero lower bound and the economy enters a
severe recession and never recovers. In treatment 2b (Á¼) we observe convergence to
the fundamental steady state for two groups, while the third group exhibits small
oscillations around the fundamental steady state.
We conclude that also under the assumption of naive expectations for the output
gap, an interest rate rule that responds more than point to point to deviations of
the in°ation rate from the target stabilizes the economy.
The upper panels of Fig. 5 reproduce the behavior of the output gap, in°ation
and individual forecasts for both variables in two di®erent sessions of treatment 3a.
Recall that in treatment 3 realized in°ation and output gap depend on the indi-
vidual forecasts for both in°ation and output gap. In both groups of treatment 3a
(Á¼ = 1) we observe (almost) convergence to a non-fundamental steady state4. In
4Note that group 1 ends in period 26 because of a crash of one of the computers in the lab.
Moreover realized in°ation and output gap in group 2 are plotted until period 49 because of an
end e®ect. In fact, participant 3 predicted an in°ation rate of 100% in the last period, causing
































































































Figure 4: Upper panels: Treatment 2a. Lower panels: Treatment 2b. Blue
thick line: realized in°ation; yellow thick line: realized output gap; thin lines:
individual forecasts for in°ation.
































































Figure 5: Upper panels: Treatment 3a. Lower panels: Treatement 3b. Blue
thick line: realized in°ation; yellow thick line: realized output gap; thin lines:
individual forecasts for in°ation and output gap.
the lower panels of Fig. 5 we plot the output gap, in°ation and individual forecasts
for both variables in two sessions of treatment 3b (Á¼ = 1:5). In both groups we
observe convergence to the 2 percent fundamental steady state, but the converging
paths are di®erent. In group 1, after some initial oscillations, in°ation and out-
put gap converge more or less monotonically, while in group 2 the convergence is
oscillatory.
Hence, with subjects in the experiment forecasting both in°ation and output
gap, a monetary policy that responds aggressively to °uctuations in the in°ation
rate stabilizes °uctuations in in°ation and output and leads the economy to the
desired outcome.
In order to get more insights into the stabilizing e®ect of a more aggressive
actual in°ation to jump to about 20%.
















2b (median) 0.0437 0.0400
3a-1 (excl. t=50) 1.2159 0.1073
3b-1 0.4804 0.1865
3b-2 0.4366 0.2256
3b (median) 0.4585 0.2060
Table 2: Average quadratic di®erence from the REE
monetary policy, Table 2 summarizes, the quadratic distance of in°ation and output
gap from its RE fundamental benchmark for all treatments. The table con¯rms our
earlier graphical observation that a more aggressive Taylor rule stabilizes in°ation.
Increasing the Taylor coe±cient from 1 to 1:5 leads to more stable in°ation by
a factor around 6 in Treatment 1, a factor of 90 in Treatment 2 and a factor of
about 3 in Treatment 3. In contrast to in°ation the output gap is not stabilized in
our experimental economy where the central bank sets the interest rate responding
only to in°ation.
163 Individual forecasting rules
Estimation of general linear forecasting rules
For each participant we estimated a simple linear prediction rule of the form
¼
e











°iyt¡i + ¹t (3.1)
y
e











&i¼t¡i + ºt (3.2)
in which ¼e
j;t+1 and ye
j;t+1 refer to the in°ation or output gap forecast of participant
j for period t+1 (submitted in period t). Prediction rule (3.1) applies to in°ation
forecasters and prediction rule (3.2) to output gap forecasters, using both lagged
in°ation and lagged output. These prediction rules assume that participants do
not use information with a lag of more than three periods; the regression results
(see below) show that this is generally a reasonable assumption. We allow for a
learning phase, during which participants have not yet fully formed their prediction
rules, by leaving the ¯rst 11 periods of the experiment out of the regression sample.
Tables 1 { 7 in Supplementary material show the regression results. Of the 102
participants5 78% submitted predictions that can be described by a linear rule of the
form (3.1) or (3.2) satisfying standard diagnostic tests.6 In all treatments, the most
popular signi¯cant regressor is the last available value of the forecasting objective
(¼t¡1 or yt¡1). This is followed in most treatments by either the most recent own
prediction (¼e
t or ye
t) or the second last available forecasting objective (¼t¡2 or yt¡2).
Looking at the estimated coe±cients, a remarkable property is that all but one of
the non-zero coe±cients with both the last available forecasting objective and the
most recent own prediction are positive suggesting some form of adaptive behavior
(see below). In contrast, a clear majority of the non-zero coe±cients of remaining
5The prediction rule speci¯cations (3.1) and (3.2) were applied to all participants except for
those in group 3 of Treatment 2a (see Fig. 4) and group 1 of Treatment 3a (see Fig. 5), which
experienced respectively total economic collapse and a computer crash during the experiment.
6Estimated prediction rules were tested for autocorrelation (Breusch-Godfrey test, 2 lags),
heteroskedasticity (White test, no cross terms) and misspeci¯cation (Ramsey RESET test, 1
¯tted term). A signi¯cance level of 5% was used.
17regressors, excluding the constant, is negative. Averaging over the participants of
all treatments, the number of signi¯cant regressors, including the constant, in the
estimated prediction rules is 3.4.
The estimation results indicate that most participants, largely irrespective of
the treatment they are in, use a consistent, linear prediction rule, at least after
a learning phase of 11 periods. What is more, there are clear regularities across
groups and treatments regarding the variables the prediction rules are composed
of and the sign of their coe±cients. Speci¯cally, the fact that the two latest obser-
vations of the forecasting objective and the latest own prediction are generally the
most used prediction rule components, implies that these variables are of particular
importance in the prediction rule speci¯cation. The relatively low average number
of signi¯cant regressors, at 3.4 compared to the 10 potential regressors (including
the constant) in (3.1) and (3.2), means that the other variables are used very little
as input to form predictions. It may therefore be worthwhile to restrict speci¯ca-
tions (3.1) and (3.2) by leaving out these infrequently used regressors. The fact
that the estimated non-zero coe±cients for the most recent values of the forecast-
ing objective and the own prediction are almost all positive, while the non-zero
coe±cients of the other variables tend to be negative, similarly suggests that the
rule speci¯cations (3.1) and (3.2) are too °exible. Restricting (3.1) and (3.2) along
the lines of these regularities could increase the e±ciency of the estimates, as well
as make the estimated rules easier to interpret from a behavioral viewpoint.
Estimation of an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic
The estimation results of the previous section indicate that the general predic-
tion rules (3.1) and (3.2) can for most participants be restricted without losing
much explanatory power. One way of strongly reducing the number of parameters
while preserving much of the speci¯cations' °exibility is by ¯tting an anchoring-
and-adjustment heuristic, (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)), named First-Order









¼t + ®3(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼t¡2) + ¹t(3.3)
y
e





yt + °3(yt¡1 ¡ yt¡2) + ºt (3.4)
The ¯rst three terms in (3.3) and (3.4) are a weighted average of the latest real-
ization of the forecasting objective, the latest own prediction and the forecasting
objective's sample mean (excluding the learning phase). This weighted average is
the (time varying) \anchor" of the prediction, which is a zeroth order extrapolation
from the available data at period t. The fourth term in (3.3) and (3.4) is a simple
linear, i.e. ¯rst order, extrapolation from the two most recent realizations of the
forecasting objective; this term is the \adjustment" or trend extrapolation part of
the heuristic. An advantages of the FOH rule is that it simpli¯es to well-known
rules-of-thumb for di®erent boundary values of the parameter space. For exam-
ple, the in°ation prediction rule (3.3) reduces to Naive Expectations if ®1 = 1,
®2 = ®3 = 0; it reduces to Adaptive Expectations if ®1 + ®2 = 1, ®3 = 0. Another
special case occurs when ®1 = ®2 = 0, so that the anchor reduces to the sample
average; we will refer to this case as Fundamentalists, as the sample average is
a proxy of the steady state equilibrium level of in°ation or output. In the more
°exible case ®1 + ®3 = 1, ®2 = 0 the anchor is time varying; we will refer to this
case as a learning anchor and adjustment (LAA) rule.
We estimated the FOH rules (3.3) and (3.4) for participants that have a pre-
diction rule of type (3.1) or (3.2) satisfying standard diagnostic tests (see previous
Section), and that are not signi¯cantly worse described by a FOH rule than by
7For other applications of the FOH in modeling expectation formation, see Heemeijer,
Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2009) and Heemeijer (2009).
8In the estimation of (3.3) and (3.4) we included the sample mean of in°ation resp. output,
which is of course not available to the subjects at the moment of the prediction but acts as a
proxy of the equilibrium level. In the heuristic switching model of section 4 we will use the sample
average of all previous realizations at every point in time, which generally converges quickly to
the sample mean, as an anchor.
19a general linear rule. The second criterion was veri¯ed by a Wald test on joint
parameter restriction. It turns out that 59 out of the 102 participants used in the
regression analysis, that is, 58%, pass both criteria. These results are in line with
the ¯ndings in Adam (2007) where simple forecast functions that condition on a
single explanatory variable capture subjects' expectations fairly well. For the par-
ticipants whose forecasting rules can be successfully restricted to a FOH rule, the
estimation results are shown in Tables 8 { 10 in the Supplementary material. Also
indicated in Tables 8 { 10 in the Supplementary material are the rules-of-thumb,
if any, that the estimated FOH rules are equivalent to (again according to Wald
tests). Looking across treatments, the most frequent classi¯cations for the anchors
of the prediction rules are Naive and Adaptive Expectations. However, the anchors
of almost half of the participants with a FOH rule (26 out of 59) are not equivalent
to a well-known rule-of-thumb and are therefore described as \other." Regarding
the adjustment part of the estimated FOH rules, it is interesting to see that all
participants with a trend extrapolating term in their FOH rules are trend followers,
i.e. the coe±cient ®3 > 0, ranging from 0:3 to 1:4. More than half of the estimated
FOH rules (31 out of 59) have a trend-following adjustment term.
Figs. 6(a) { 6(d) illustrate the estimation results in the three-dimensional space
(®1;®2;®3). The individual FOH rules are represented by dots in the FOH rule's
prismatic parameter space. The prisms show concentrations of dots at the regions
corresponding to Naive Expectations (®1 = 1, ®2 = ®3 = 0), Adaptive Expecta-
tions (®1 +®2 = 1, ®3 = 0), or Trend-Following Expectations (®3 > 0), con¯rming
the classi¯cation results above. At the same time, there are substantial di®erences
between the prisms. In particular, Figs. 6(b) and 6(d) show that almost all par-
ticipants using an FOH rule in Treatments 2a, 2b and 3b have a trend-following
adjustment term, while this is much less frequently the case in Treatments 1a,
1b and 3a (see Figs. 6(a) and 6(c)). Comparing with the experimental results
(Figs. 3 { 5), the presence of trend-following forecasting rules is clearly related
to oscillations in the forecasting objective, which occur more often in Treatments
20(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6: Estimated coe±cient vectors of First-Order Heuristics (FOH) prediction
rules for the participants. The graph on the right of each prism presents a top-down
view of the prism. Top left: dark dots correspond to participants of Treatment
1a; light dots to participants of Treatment 1b. Top right: dark dots correspond to
participants of Treatment 2a; light dots to participants of Treatment 2b. Bottom
left: dark dots correspond to in°ation forecasters of Treatment 3a; light dots to
output gap forecasters of Treatment 3a. Bottom right: Dark dots correspond
to in°ation forecasters of Treatment 3b; light dots to output gap forecasters of
Treatment 3b.
212a, 3a and 3b than in the rest of the experiment. Also, an interesting di®erence
between Figs. 6(c) and 6(d) is that Fig. 6(c) contains a cluster of dots close to
Naive Expectations, while Fig. 6(d) contains a cluster close to Fundamentalist
Expectations (i.e. predictions equal to the forecasting objective's sample mean).
Comparing with Fig. 5, it is apparent that the reason for this di®erence is that
in°ation and, to a lesser extent, output gap, do not fully converge in Treatment 3a,
while they do converge in Treatment 3b. This makes a constant anchor such as in
Fundamentalist Expectations more useful in Treatment 3b, and a °exible anchor
such as in Naive Expectations more useful in Treatment 3a.
Graphical evidence for strategy switching
The estimated forecasting rules (3.3) and (3.4) assume a ¯xed individual predic-
tion rule over the last 40 periods of the experiment. This should be viewed as
an approximate forecasting rule; in reality agents may learn and switch to a dif-
ferent forecasting heuristic. This section presents graphical evidence of switching
behavior. Fig. 7 shows the time series of some individual forecasts together with
the realizations of the variable being forecasted. For every period t we plot the
realized in°ation or output gap together with the two period ahead forecast of the
individual. In this way we can graphically infer how the individual prediction uses
the last available observation. For example, if the time series coincide, the subject
is using a naive forecasting strategy.
In Fig. 7(a) (group 2, treatment 3a), subject 2 strongly extrapolates changes
in the output gap in the early stage of the experiment, but starting from period
t = 18 he switches to a much weaker form of trend extrapolation.
In Fig. 7(b) (group 1, treatment 3b), subject 4 switches between various con-
stant predictors for in°ation in the ¯rst 23 periods of the experimental session. She
is in fact initially experimenting with three predictors, 2% 3% and 5%, and then
switches to a naive forecasting strategy after period 23. In the same experimen-
tal session, Fig. 7(c), participant 6 predicting the output gap is using di®erent





























































































































































Figure 7: Individual learning as switching between heuristics. For every
period the subject's forecast xe
i;t+2 (green) and the variable being forecast xt, with
x = ¼;y, are reproduced.
trend extrapolation strategies and, in the time interval t = 19;:::;30, he uses a
constant predictor for the output gap. This group illustrates an important point:
in the same economy individuals forecasting di®erent variables may use di®erent
forecasting strategies.
In Fig. 7(d) group 2, treatment 3b, subject 1 uses a trend following rule in
the initial part of the experiment, i.e. when in°ation °uctuates more. However,
when oscillations dampen and in°ation converges to the equilibrium level, he uses
a forecasting strategy very close to naive.
A stylized fact that emerges from the investigation of individual experimental
23data is that individual learning has the form of switching from one heuristic to
another9. Anufriev and Hommes (2009) found a similar result analyzing individual
forecasting time series from the asset pricing experiments of Hommes, Sonnemans,
Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005). Moreover, the fact that di®erent types of ag-
gregate behavior, namely convergence to di®erent (non-fundamental) steady states,
oscillations and dampening oscillations arise, suggest that heterogeneous expecta-
tions play an important role in determining the aggregate outcomes. In the light
of the empirical evidence for heterogeneous expectations and individual switching
behavior, we introduce in the next section a simple model with evolutionary se-
lection between di®erent forecasting heuristics in order to reproduce individual as
well as aggregate experimental data.
4 A heterogeneous expectations model
Anufriev and Hommes (2009) developed a heuristics switching model along the lines
of Brock and Hommes (1997), to explain di®erent price °uctuations in the asset
pricing experiment of Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005).
The key idea of the model is that the subjects chose between simple heuristics
depending upon their relative past performance. The performance measure of a
forecasting heuristic is based on its absolute forecasting error and it has the same
functional form as the payo® function used in the experiments. More precisely, the
performance measure of heuristic h up to (and including) time t ¡ 1 is given by
Uh;t¡1 =
100
1 + jxt¡1 ¡ xe
h;t¡1j
+ ´Uh;t¡2;
with x = ¼;y. The parameter 0 · ´ · 1 represents the memory, measuring the
relative weight agents give to past errors of heuristic h.
9Direct evidence of switching behavior has been found in the questionnaires submitted at
the end of the experiments, where participants are explicitly asked whether they changed their
forecasting strategies throughout the experiment. About 42% of the participants answered that
they changed forecasting strategy during the experiment.
24Given the performance measure, the impact of rule h is updated according to a
discrete choice model with asynchronous updating





h=1 exp(¯Uh;t¡1) is a normalization factor. The asynchronous
updating parameter 0 · ± · 1 measures the inertia in the impact of rule h,
re°ecting the fact that not all the participants update their rule in every period or
at the same time. The parameter ¯ ¸ 0 represents the intensity of choice measuring
how sensitive individuals are to di®erences in heuristics performances.
Our goal is to explain three di®erent observed patterns of in°ation and output
in the experiment: convergence to (some) equilibrium level, permanent oscillations
and oscillatory convergence. In order to keep the number of heuristics small, we use
a heterogeneous expectation model with only four forecasting rules. These rules,
summarized in Table 3, were obtained as heuristics describing typical individual
forecasting behavior observed and estimated in our macro experiments. In order
to check the robustness of a heterogeneous expectations model across di®erent set-
tings, we ¯xed the coe±cient values to match the set of heuristics used in Anufriev
and Hommes (2009) to explain asset pricing experiments. In treatment 3 we apply
the same heuristics switching model to both in°ation and output forecasting.
Table 3: Set of heuristics
ADA adaptive rule xe
1;t+1 = 0:65xt¡1 + 0:35xe
1;t
WTR weak trend-following rule xe
2;t+1 = xt¡1 + 0:4(xt¡1 ¡ xt¡2)
STR strong trend-following rule xe
3;t+1 = xt¡1 + 1:3(xt¡1 ¡ xt¡2)
LAA anchoring and adjustment rule xe
4;t+1 = 0:5(xav
t¡1 + xt¡1) + (xt¡1 ¡ xt¡2)
254.1 50-periods ahead simulations
The model is initialized by two initial values for in°ation and output gap, ¼1, y1,
¼2 and y2, and initial weights nh;in, 1 · h · 4. Given the values of in°ation
and output gap for periods 1 and 2, the heuristics forecasts can be computed and,
using the initial weights of the heuristics, in°ation and output gap for period 3,
¼3 and y3, can be computed. Starting from period 4 the evolution according to
the model's equations is well de¯ned. Once we ¯x the four forecasting heuristics,
there are three free \learning" parameters left in the model: ¯, ´, and ±. We used
the same set of learning parameters as in Anufriev and Hommes (2009), namely
¯ = 0:4, ´ = 0:7, ± = 0:9, and we chose the initial shares of heuristics in such
a way to match the patterns observed in the ¯rst few periods of the experiment.
We also experimented with initial values of in°ation and output gap close to the
values observed in the ¯rst two rounds of the corresponding experimental session.
After some trial-and-error experimentation with di®erent initial conditions we were
able to replicate all three di®erent qualitative patterns observed in the experiment.
For the simulations shown in Fig. 8 we used the same realizations for demand and
supply shocks as in the experiment and we chose the initial conditions as follows:
² treatment 1b, group 1, with convergence to fundamental equilibrium level
initial in°ation rates: ¼1 = 2:5, ¼2 = 2:5;
initial fractions: n1;in = n4;in = 0:40, n2;in = n3;in = 0:10;
² treatment 2b, group 3, with permanent oscillations
initial in°ation: ¼1 = 2:64, ¼2 = 2:70 (experimental data);
initial output gap: y1 = ¡0:20, y2 = ¡0:42 (experimental data);
initial fractions: n1;in = 0, n2;in = n3;in = 0:20, n4;in = 0:60;
² treatment 3a, group 2, with convergence to a non-fundamental steady state
initial in°ation: ¼1 = 2:4, ¼2 = 2:0 ;
initial output gap: y1 = 1:8, y2 = 2 ;
initial fractions in°ation: n1;in = 0:60, n2;in = 0:05, n3;in = 0:10, n4;in = 0:25
26initial fractions output gap: n1;in = 0:6, n2;in = 0:05, n3;in = 0:15, n4;in = 0:20:
² treatment 3b, group 2, with oscillatory convergence
initial in°ation: ¼1 = 3:98, ¼2 = 3:72 (experimental data);
initial output gap: y1 = 0:28, y2 = ¡0:05 (experimental data);
initial fractions in°ation: n1;in = 0, n2;in = 0:10, n3;in = 0:40, n4;in = 0:50
initial fractions output gap: n1;in = 0:15, n2;in = 0:20, n3;in = 0:50, n4;in =
0:15:
Fig. 8 shows realizations of in°ation and output gap in the experiment together
with the simulated paths using the heuristics switching model10. The model is
able to reproduce qualitatively all three di®erent patterns observed in the exper-
iment, which are, convergence to (some) equilibrium, permanent oscillations and
oscillatory convergence11. As shown in Table 4, the model is also capable to match
some quantitative features of the experimental data, such as the mean and the
variance12.
Table 4: Observed vs simulated moments (50-periods ahead)
Treatment
1b 2b 3a (¼) 3a (y) 3b (¼) 3b (y)
¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2
Obs. 2.19 0.01 2.05 0.18 3.06 0.14 0.29 0.03 2.20 0.23 -0.02 0.23
Sim. 2.15 0.02 2.03 0.17 3.13 0.05 0.24 0.04 2.03 0.22 -0.07 0.33
p 0.06 0.03 0.74 0.71 ¤ ¤ 0.32 0.19 0.01 0.67 0.50 0.05
¤ = Non stationarity.
The row corresponding to p reports p-values of tests on the equality of observed and simulated
mean and on the equality of observed and simulated variance (HAC Consistent covariance esti-
mators (Newey-West) have been used to compute standard errors).
10Treatment 3a group 2 has been simulated for 49 periods due to a clear ending e®ect, see
footnote 4.
11We reported only simulations for some representative experimental economies which account
for the three di®erent aggregate behaviors observed in the experiment. Results for experimental
economies with analogous qualitative behavior are similar.
12We performed the tests on the equality of observed and simulated mean and variance on a
sample that goes from period 4 to the end of the experimental session in order to minimize the
impact of the initial conditions.


















































































Figure 8: Experimental data (blue points) and 50-periods ahead heuristics
switching model simulations (red lines)
284.2 One-period ahead simulations
The 50-period ahead simulations ¯x initial states and then predicts in°ation and
output patterns 50-periods ahead. We now report the results of one-step ahead
simulations of the nonlinear switching model. At each time step, the simulated
path uses experimental data as inputs to compute the heuristics' forecasts and up-
date their impacts. Hence, the one-period ahead simulations use exactly the same
information as the subjects in the experiments. The one-period ahead simulations
match the di®erent patterns in the experimental data quite nicely. Fig. 9 compares
the experimental data with the one-step ahead predictions made by our model,
using the benchmark parameter values ¯ = 0:4, ´ = 0:7, ± = 0:9. In these simu-
lations initial in°ation and output gap initial in°ation and output gap in the ¯rst
two periods are taken from the corresponding experimental group, while the initial
impacts of all heuristics are equal to 0:25.
Fig. 10 shows how in di®erent groups di®erent heuristics are taking the lead
after starting from a uniform distribution. In treatment 1b group 1 (Fig. 10(a)),
the initial drop in in°ation, from 3:1 to 1:9 respectively in periods 1 and 2, causes
an overshooting in the predictions of the trend extrapolating rules, i.e. WTF, STF
and LAA, for in°ation in period 3. Therefore the relative impacts of these rules
starts to drop, while the relative share of adaptive expectations ADA increases
to about 70% in the ¯rst 14 periods. From period 14 on, the share of the WTF
rule increases due to some slow oscillation, and it reaches a peak of about 48%
in period 33. During this time span of slow oscillations the fraction of the ADA
rule decreases to about 30%. However, in the last part of the experiment in°ation
stabilizes and the ADA rule dominates the other rules. In group 3 treatment
2b (Fig. 10(b)) we clearly observe that the ADA rule is not able to match the
oscillatory pattern and its impact declines monotonically in the simulation. The
STF rule can follow the oscillatory pattern and initially dominates (almost 40% in
period 8) but its predictions overshoot the trend in realized in°ation reverses, and
its relative share declines monotonically from period 9 on. Both the WTF and the













































































Output gap dynamics, treatment 3b, group 2
Figure 9: Experimental data (blue points) and one-period ahead heuristics
switching model simulations (red lines)












Impact of 4 rules, treatment 1b, group 1
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Impacts 4 rules, treatment 2b, group 3
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Impacts of 4 rules (inflation), treatment 3a, group 2
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Impacts 4 rules (output gap), treatment 3a, group 2
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Impact 4 rules (inflation), treatment 3b, group 2
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Impacts 4 rules (output gap), treatment 3b, group 2
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Figure 10: Evolution of fractions of 4 heuristics corresponding to one-period ahead
simulations in Fig. 9: adaptive expectations (ADA, blue), weak trend follower
(WTF, red), strong trend follower (STF, black), anchoring and adjustment heuris-
tics (LAA, green).
31LAA rule can follow closely the observed oscillations, but in the last part of the
experiment the LAA rule dominates the other rules. As in the quite di®erent setting
of the asset pricing experiments in Anufriev and Hommes (2009), our simulation
explains oscillatory behavior by coordination on the LAA rule by most subjects.
In the early stage of treatment 3a, group 2 (Fig. 10(c)), the oscillations in in°ation
are relatively small and therefore the WTF rule is able to match the oscillatory
pattern; also the ADA rule performs reasonably well, while both the STF and
LAA rules overshoot too often. Then in°ation undergoes a more turbulent phase
with stronger oscillations starting in period 24 and the impact of the strong trend
following rule increases and reaches a peak of about 30% in period 35. At the same
time, when in°ation °uctuates the share of the ADA rule declines. In the last part
of the experiment in°ation more or less stabilizes and the impact of the WTF rule
declines monotonically, while, the impact of the ADA rule rises from less than 10%
to about 50% in the last 10 periods of the experiment. Interestingly, in the same
economy the story is di®erent for the output gap (10(d)). In fact the dynamics
are characterized by oscillations in the early stage of the experiment which are less
pronounced than the oscillations in the in°ation rate. The model then explains the
convergence pattern of output gap with small oscillation by coordination of most
individuals on the ADA rule and a share of WTF that varies between 7% and 25%
throughout the experiment. A novel feature of our heuristics switching model is
that it allows for coordination on di®erent forecasting rules for di®erent aggregate
variable of the same economy. In°ation expectations are dominated by weak trend
followers, causing in°ation to slowly drift away to the \wrong" non-fundamental
steady state, while output expectations are dominated by adaptive expectations,
causing output to converge (slowly) to its fundamental steady state level.
For treatment 3b group 2 (Fig. 10(e)), the one step ahead forecast exercise
produces a rich evolutionary competition among heuristics. In the initial part of
the experiment, the STF is the only rule able to match the strong decline in the
in°ation rate and its share increases to 50% in period 8. However the impact
32of the STF rule starts to decrease after it misses the ¯rst turning point. After
the initial phase of strong trend in in°ation, the LAA rule does a better job in
predicting the trend reversal and its impact starts to increase, reaching a share
of about 70% in period 18. However oscillations slowly dampen and therefore the
impacts of the ADA rule and the WTF rule starts to rise. Towards the end of
the simulation, when in°ation has converged, the ADA rule dominates the other
heuristics. The evolutionary selection dynamics are somewhat di®erent for the
output gap predictors (Fig. 10(f)). In fact, oscillations of the output gap are
more frequent and this implies a relatively bad forecasting performance of the
STF rule that tends to overshoot more often. The switching model explains the
oscillatory behavior of output in the initial phase by coordination on the LAA rule
by most subjects. However, with dampening oscillations the impact of the LAA
rule gradually decreases and the ADA rule starts increasing after period 25 and
dominates in the last 10 periods. Fig. 11 reports the predictions of the participants
in the experiments together with the predictions generated by the four heuristics,
while Table 5 compares observed and simulated moments13.
Table 5: Observed vs simulated moments (one-period ahead)
Treatment
1b 2b 3a (¼) 3a (y) 3b (¼) 3b (y)
¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2 ¹ ¾2
Obs. 2.19 0.01 2.05 0.18 3.06 0.14 0.29 0.03 2.20 0.23 -0.02 0.23
Sim. 2.17 0.01 2.05 0.16 3.08 0.14 0.25 0.04 2.21 0.32 -0.09 0.40
p 0.02 0.86 0.83 0.16 0.24 0.78 0.01 0.15 0.60 0.05 0.03 0.01
The row corresponding to p reports p-values of tests on the equality of observed and simulated
mean and on the equality of observed and simulated variance (HAC Consistent covariance esti-
mators (Newey-West) have been used to compute standard errors).
13We performed tests on the equality of observed and simulated mean and variance on a sample
that goes from period 4 to the end of the experimental session in order to minimize the impact
of initial conditions.
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Figure 11: Left panels: predictions of the participants in the experiment. Right
panels: predictions of the four heuristics.
34Forecasting performance
Table 6 compares the MSE of the one-step ahead prediction in 10 experimental
groups14 for 9 di®erent models: the rational expectation prediction (RE), six ho-
mogeneous expectations models (naive expectations, ¯xed anchor and adjustment
(AA) rule15, and each of the four heuristics of the switching model), the switching
model with benchmark parameters ¯ = 0:4, ´ = 0:7, and ± = 0:9, and the "best"
switching model ¯tted by means of a grid search in the parameters space. The
MSEs for the benchmark switching model are shown in bold and, for comparison,
for each group the MSEs for the best among the four heuristics are also shown in
bold. The best among all models for each group is shown in italic16. We notice im-
mediately that the RE prediction is (almost) always the worst. It also appears that
the evolutionary learning model is able to make the best out of di®erent heuristics.
In fact, none of the homogeneous expectations models ¯ts all di®erent observed
patterns, while the best ¯t switching model yields the lowest MSE in 9=1517 cases,
being the second best, with only a slightly larger MSE compared to the best model,
in the other cases (with the exceptions of group 1 in treatment 2a and groups 2
and 3 in treatment 3a). Notice also that the benchmark switching model typically
is almost as good as the best switching model, indicating that the results are not
very sensitive to the learning parameters.
14The MSE of the one-step ahead prediction for the remaining groups is reported in the Sup-
plementary material, Table 11
15In the AA rule we consider the full sample mean, which is a proxy of the equilibrium level,
as an anchor. In the LAA rule instead we use the sample average of all the previous realizations
that are available at every point in time as an anchor.
16We evaluate the MSE over 47 periods, for t = 4;:::;50. This minimizes the impact of initial
conditions for the switching model in the sense that t = 4 is the ¯rst period when the prediction
is computed with both the heuristics forecasts and the heuristics impacts being updated on the
basis of experimental data.
17We excluded treatment 1a, group 2 and did not ¯t the heuristics switching model because of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the model, we
¯rst perform a grid search to ¯nd the parameters of the model minimizing the MSE
for a restricted sample, i.e. for periods t = 4;:::;43. Then, the squared forecasting
errors are computed for the next 7 periods. The results are shown in Table 7 and
in the Supplementary material, Table 12. Finally, we compare the out-of-sample
forecasting performance of the structural heuristics switching model (both the best
¯t and the model with benchmark parameters) with a simple non-structural AR(2)
model with three parameters. Notice that, for treatment 3 we use di®erent AR(2)
models for in°ation and output gap, so that we have in fact 6 parameters for the
AR(2) models in treatment 3.
For the converging groups (treatment 1a groups 1 and 3, treatment 1b groups
1 and 2, treatment 2a group 1, treatment 2b groups 1 and 2, treatment 3a groups
1 and 2, treatment 3b group 1) we typically observe that the squared prediction
errors remain very low and comparable with the MSEs computed in-sample. This
is due to the fact that the qualitative behavior of the data does not change in the
last periods. For the groups that exhibit oscillatory behavior (treatment 1b group
3, treatment 2a, groups 2 and 3, treatment 2b group 3) the out-of-sample errors are
larger than the in-sample MSEs, and they typically increase with the time horizon
of the prediction. When we instead observe dampening oscillations (treatment
3b, group 2), the out-of-sample prediction errors are smaller than the in-sample
MSEs. This is due to the fact that, towards the end of the experimental session,
convergence is observed. Comparing the out-of-sample forecasting performance, we
conclude that the benchmark switching model generally does not perform worse
(sometimes even better) than the best in-sample ¯tted switching model. Compared
to the non-structural AR(2) model, the switching model on average performs better.
In particular, for treatment 3 the benchmark switching model as well as the 3-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this paper we use laboratory experiments with human subjects to study indi-
vidual expectations, their interactions and the aggregate behavior they co-create
within a New Keynesian macroeconomic setup. A novel feature of our experimental
design is that realizations of aggregate variables depend on individual forecasts of
two di®erent variables, output gap and in°ation. We ¯nd that individuals tend to
base their predictions on past observations, following simple forecasting heuristics,
and individual learning takes the form of switching from one heuristic to another.
We propose a simple model of evolutionary selection among forecasting rules based
on past performance in order to explain the di®erent aggregate outcomes observed
in the laboratory experiments, namely convergence to some equilibrium level, per-
sistent oscillatory behavior and oscillatory convergence. Our model is the ¯rst to
describe aggregate behavior in an economy with heterogeneous individual expec-
tations on two di®erent variables. Simulations of the heuristics switching model
show that the model is able to match individual forecasting behavior and nicely
reproduce the di®erent observed patterns of aggregate variables. A distinguish-
ing feature of our heterogeneous expectations model is that evolutionary selection
may lead to di®erent dominating forecasting rules for di®erent variables within
the same economy (see Figs. 10(c) and 10(d) where a weak trend following rule
dominates in°ation forecasting while adaptive expectations dominate output fore-
casting). We also perform an exercise of empirical validation on the experimental
data to test the model's performance in terms of in-sample forecasting as well as
out-of-sample predicting power. Our results show that the heterogeneous expec-
tations model outperforms models with homogeneous expectations, including the
rational expectations benchmark. On the policy side we ¯nd that the implementa-
tion of a monetary policy that reacts aggressively to deviations of in°ation from the
target leads the economy to the desired target, at least in the long run. In the short
run, however, oscillations in in°ation and output may arise due to coordination of
39individual expectations on trend following rules.
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